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Abstract
Studying human behaviour in virtual environments provides extraordinary oppor-
tunities for a quantitative analysis of social phenomena with levels of accuracy that
approach those of the natural sciences. In this paper we use records of player activi-
ties in the massive multiplayer online game Pardus over 1,238 consecutive days, and
analyze dynamical features of sequences of actions of players. We build on previous
work were temporal structures of human actions of the same type were quantified,
and extend provide an empirical understanding of human actions of different types.
This study of multi-level human activity can be seen as a dynamic counterpart of
static multiplex network analysis. We show that the interevent time distributions of
actions in the Pardus universe follow highly non-trivial distribution functions, from
which we extract action-type specific characteristic “decay constants”. We discuss
characteristic features of interevent time distributions, including periodic patterns
on different time scales, bursty dynamics, and various functional forms on differ-
ent time scales. We comment on gender differences of players in emotional actions,
and find that while male and female act similarly when performing some positive
actions, females are slightly faster for negative actions. We also observe effects on
the age of players: more experienced players are generally faster in making decisions
about engaging and terminating in enmity and friendship, respectively.
Key words: quantitative sociology, human action dynamics, time series analysis,
online games
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1 Introduction
The life of humans can be viewed as a sequence of different actions that are
carried out from birth to death. Some of these actions are carried out with high
regularity on various timescales (circadian, yearly, etc.), others have significant
stochastic components. By now it is well established that distribution functions
characterising sequences of human actions over time are highly non-trivial
[1–12], and their origins remain largely unclear.
The very fact that distributions of human actions over time, such as distribu-
tions of phone calls, follow statistical laws was known since the beginning of
the last century [13], and triggered the origin of queueing theory [14]. Early at-
tempts to understand human action sequences were based on the assumption
that actions are carried out homogeneously in time with constant rates, which
then lead to Poisson processes [15]. This lead to the conclusion that times
between consecutive actions of the same individual should be distributed ex-
ponentially. Models to describe human dynamics that are based on Poisson
processes are still widely used [16, 17]. However, the careful analysis of vari-
ous patterns of human activity provides growing evidence for highly inhomo-
geneous bursty distributions of human actions in time. Further there is evi-
dence for non-trivial inter-dependencies of actions that influence their (usually
power-law dominated) temporal statistics [1–12]. The latter were found both
for traditional human actions such as writing letters [3,7], checking out books
in libraries, performing financial transactions [4], or writing e-mails [1, 2, 6],
web browsing [4], sending text messages [9], editing Wikipedia pages [10, 12],
and many more. Different reasons have been suggested to explain their appear-
ance. In particular, the priority queueing model [2] is a possibility to explain
the bursty mechanism of human behavior by a decision-based queueing pro-
cess where individuals perform tasks according to some priority. This may
explain the observed correspondence patterns of Darwin and Einstein [3]. Al-
ternatively it has been hypothesized that human correspondence is driven not
by responses to others but by the variation in an individual’s communication
needs over the course of their lifetime [7].
The common feature of the above mentioned observations is that they are
based on the analysis of human actions of a single type: either writing e-
mails, or letters, or making phone calls, etc. The next step beyond these
studies is to consider the much more involved situation where tasks of different
types are performed. What is the action dynamics of an individual (or of a
group of individuals) that writes both e-mails, and letters, and makes phone
calls? Carrying out actions of different types we callmulti-level human activity.
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The analysis of multilevel activity encounters obvious difficulties, typically
requiring serious efforts on data collection [18]. In this study we circumvent this
problem by studying the log-files of all actions performed in a virtual world,
where actions of different types are performed by thousands of people [19,20].
The virtual universe of the online game Pardus [21] is briefly outlined below.
Pardus is a massive multiplayer online game (MMOG) which is online since
2004. It is an open-ended game with a worldwide player base of more than
400,000 registered players [21, 22]. The game has a science fiction setting and
features three different universes. All universes have a fixed start date but no
scheduled end date. Every player controls one avatar, called the player’s char-
acter. The characters act within a virtual world making up their own goals
and interacting with the self-organized social environment. There is a variety
of different activities the characters can participate in, including communica-
tion, trade, attack, and other forms of social actions such as establishing or
breaking friendships or enmities, see Fig. 1. Since it has been launched, the
Pardus game served as a unique testing ground to measure different observ-
ables that characterize inhabitants of the virtual world and in this way to
learn about complex social processes taking place in the real world – “When
the same six soldiers take out a dragon in a synthetic world, the dragon is not
real but the teamwork is” [23]. Indeed, with a complete record of complete
information about millions of actions of different kinds performed by thou-
sands of people during several years from a single source, this setting provides
the unique position to achieve a detailed non-intrusive quantitative analy-
sis of complex social behavior [22, 24–32]. In particular, the complex network
structure of the Pardus society has been exposed and evidence was collected
for several social-dynamics hypothesis, including the Granovetter weak ties
hypothesis and triadic closure [28]. In this way further evidence has been pro-
vided about validity of a model of online communities for human societies,
allowing to operate with a precision resembling that of natural sciences [22].
Further analysis of the Pardus society has revealed the network topology of
social interactions [24, 28], mobility of characters [25], behavioral action se-
quences [26], gender differences in networking [27], and the functioning of the
virtual economy [30].
The main idea of this paper is to analyze the evolution of actions within the
Pardus universe over time: what are the temporal characteristics of actions
taken by players? Is there an action-specific dynamics, and are there some
global processes that dominate the dynamics of players in the online world?
It is well established by now that a number of features of the virtual society
resemble those in the offline society, giving hope to expect that the analysis of
the virtual world action dynamics will provide insights into human dynamics
that is valid also for real societies. Social systems can be quantified com-
prehensively by studying the superposition of its constituting socio-economic
networks (multiplex networks, see [33–35]) [24]. The same information is con-
3
Player146 ... AAAAAACTT EEX FTTTTTX CCCTTTTT AC ...
Player 199 ... CCA BBCAAAAATTA AACCCCCBX CFFFF ...
Player 701 ... CCCCTTTT TCTCT FF CXXTT CCCCC TTT ...
Player 171 ... AAAACC CCC C CCC AA TTT FCC EED ...
Figure 1. Short segment of action sequences, performed by four Pardus players. Dif-
ferent actions are shown by different letters as explained in Section 2. The detailed
analysis of time sequences of these multi-level action streams is the main goal of
this paper.
tained in the dynamical behavioural sequences (Fig. 1) of the individuals,
however with a focus on temporal aspects of the multi-level activity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the database and
concentrate on the main observable of interest, the interevent time τ and
its statistics. We comment on the bursty dynamics of individual characters.
Action-specific dynamics is studied in Section 3. There we analyze inherent
features of actions of different types and compare actions performed by dif-
ferent types of players such as male and female. The dynamics of the entire
community of players in the Pardus game is analyzed in Section 4. In par-
ticular, we discuss an increase of activity during periods of war in the game.
Conclusions and outlook are presented in Section 5.
2 Data set and general statistics of interevent times
The Pardus world consists of three different game universes: Orion, Artemis,
and Pegasus. In this study we concentrate on the Artemis universe because
in this Universe complete data is available for all actions of all players [22].
The Artemis universe is also the most densely populated universe over time,
inhabited by more than 7,000 active characters (see Table 1 for more details).
Artemis was opened on June 10, 2007. Our analysis is based on the information
about player activities during 1,238 consecutive days since the universe was
opened. Every character in the game is a pilot who owns a spacecraft, travels
in the universe and is able to perform a number of activities of different type.
There is no specified goal in the game, the players make up their own goals
and interact with their self-organized social environment. Every player picks
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a male or female avatar, the age of the player is measured as a the number of
days since the first registration. We concentrate on the following actions that
can be acted out within the game
• sending private messages from one player to another (communication, C);
• attacking other players or their belongings (attack, A);
• trading or giving gifts (trade, T);
• marking friends by adding their names to a friend list (F);
• marking enemies by adding their names to an enemy list (E);
• removing friends from the friend list (D);
• removing enemies from the enemy list (X).
More information is found in [22]. It is important to note that actions per-
formed by a character (such as trade, travel, adding/removing friends) cost a
certain amount of so-called action points (APs). The number of APs available
per character at once cannot exceed 6,100. For each character which owns less
APs than their maximum, every 6 minutes 24 APs are automatically gener-
ated. Once a character is out of APs, they have to wait for new APs to be
regenerated. Social interactions, e.g. sending private messages, planning, co-
ordination, etc., do not cost APs. This feature adds one additional difference
between the action types and causes peculiarities in the behavior of characters,
as we will see below.
The above actions can be labeled as “positive” or “negative” depending on
their nature: A, E and D are considered as negative, while C, T, F, X are
considered positive [22,26]. In some cases this classification may be questioned.
For example, thorough categorization of the private messages would have to
take into account their content. However, we will classify C as a positive action
because only a negligible part of communication in Pardus takes place between
enemies [22]. Since private messages are the most frequently performed actions
(≈ 80%), the number of positive actions is much larger than the number of
negative ones.
Two observables are widely used to quantify action streams [2–4, 6, 7, 9, 12,
36]. These are interevent time, i.e. the time interval between two consecutive
actions of the same person, and the waiting time, defined as the time interval
between the action (of one person) and reaction (of another person). The
last quantity is sometimes understood as the “time to reciprocate”. In the
correspondence pattern analysis the reaction on a received letter is another
letter that is sent in reply. However, there might also be mixed reciprocity,
where the type of reaction differs from an action itself – say, an email sent
as a reaction on a phone call received. Because of this, we first simply focus
on the interevent time, ignoring the type of action. We denote this by τ . In
Tab. 1 we collect the main features of the data set. The overall number of
characters that have performed at least one action in the Artemis universe is
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Table 1
Characteristics of the data set. N is the number of characters that performed actions
of a given type; Na, overall number of actions performed by these characters during
the observation period within 1, 238 consecutive days.Nτ is the number of interevent
time (τ) values. τmin, τmax are minimal and maximal values of interevent times given
in seconds.
Action type N Na Nτ τ
max τmin
All 7,818 8,373,209 8,365,391 63,882,774 0
Positive 7,806 7,492,460 7,484,648 63,882,774 0
Negative 6,918 880,749 873,831 91,715,678 0
A 5,412 742,798 737,386 100,686,258 0
T 6,883 561,327 554,444 86,705,400 0
C 7,799 6,775,950 6,768,151 72,931,246 0
E 5,638 105,958 100,320 100,232,580 2
F 7,067 125,984 118,917 100,736,362 1
X 3,653 29,199 25,546 87,400,240 1
D 3,188 31,993 28,805 95,379,313 1
N = 7, 818, the overall number of actions performed during the observation
period of 1, 238 consecutive days is Na = 8, 373, 209. The majority of actions
belong to the positive type (F,C,T,X), due to the fact that C are considered
as positive actions. The next in frequency are: A, T, F, E, D, and X. The
number of actions Na is action type specific and ranges from Na = 6, 775, 950
for C, to Na = 29, 199 for X. The number of players N that are involved in any
specific type of action is distributed rather homogeneously: several thousands
of players for each action.
The histogram of the number of actions is shown in Fig. 2. The majority of
players performed just a few actions during the entire period, while a few
very active players provided huge activity statistics. We find an approximate
power law scaling with an exponent of ∼ −1.18. Players with a small number
of actions typically quit the game just after registration. These players are
not representative so that we exclude all players that performed less than 50
actions. Since all actions are time stamped with an accuracy of one second, we
can calculate interevent times, τ . The distribution of τ follows a power law as
seen in Figs. 3a and 3b. The exponent dependents on the chosen time scale (bin
size). The periodic pattern (inset) corresponds to circadian cycles [10, 11, 17].
To focus on the dynamics within the first 24 hours (most frequent values for
τ) we take a bin size of 1 min, Fig. 3b. The local minimum, which appears
on this scale for τ = 7 hours = 25, 200 sec can be explained by the “active
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Figure 2. Number of players who performed k actions during the observation time.
The majority of players performed few actions during the entire period, while a few
very active players provided huge activity statistics. The line shows scaling with an
exponent of ∼ −1.18.
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Figure 3. Distribution of the interevent time τ for all players who performed at least
50 actions. (a) entire observation period (1,238 days), bin size is 6 hours=21; 600
sec. The inset shows a six day period. Circadian rhythms are clearly visible. (b)
First 24 hours, bin size is 1 min.
working day”. Since it is more convenient to play in the morning (before
work) or in the evening (after work), interevent intervals of 7 hours are less
probable than those for 8, 9, or 10 hours. One observes a further regime at
small values of τ , corresponding to immediate or slightly delayed repetition.
This can be observed within the first 3 minutes after the performed action.
This is due to the peculiarities of different actions. For example, attacks could
be naturally grouped into sequences due to repeatedly pressing an attack
button to attack the same opponent, while a separate decision is needed to
add each new enemy. Further, player synchronization might play a substantial
role, where two players can react promptly when they are both online, but only
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Figure 4. Action streams of players with different values of burstiness B. Lines mark
times of executed actions, the distance between lines is the interevent time.
with a (significant) delay if one is offline. It is possible that the shape of the
interevent times distribution after these first “immediate” values is influenced
by the login behavior of players.
The power-law-like distribution of interevent times between the actions indi-
cates the bursty nature of human dynamics [2, 3, 5]: periods of high activity
are separated by long periods of inactivity. Although the origins of such a
non-uniform distribution of actions are highly diverse, it is recognized to be
an inherent feature of human dynamics. A measure for burstiness B was in-
troduced in [8], its simplified version (see [10, 12]) is defined as follows:
B ≡
σ −m
σ +m
, (1)
where m is the average of the interevent time τ , and σ its standard deviation.
For a regular pattern we have B ∼ −1, for a random Poissonian process with
a fixed event rate, B ∼ 0, and for fat-tailed distributions of time intervals,
B ∼ 1.
In Fig. 4 we show (compressed) action streams of players with different values
of B. Each line marks the time of an executed action. The patterns on the left-
hand side correspond to the activity with (a) maximal, (b) minimal, and (c)
close to zero values of B. A random distribution of actions over the time line
is characterized by B ∼ 0. It is observed that seemingly very different activity
patterns can be characterized by similar values of burstiness, Fig. 4d–f. The
histogram of B for all players is shown in Fig. 5a. The most frequent value
(maximum) (Bˆ ≃ 0.53) as well as the average (mean) (B ≃ 0.53) values are
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Figure 5. Histogram of burstiness calculated for (a) all action types, (b) communi-
cation C, and (c) attacks A. The most frequent (maximum) (Bˆ) and the mean (B,
red lines) values are Bˆ ≃ 0.53, B ≃ 0.53 (a); Bˆ ≃ 0.50, B ≃ 0.49 (b); Bˆ ≃ 0.65,
B ≃ 0.48 (c), respectively.
both larger than 0.5. The average burstiness values for the process of real-world
mobile communication is more than two times smaller, B ≃ 0.2 [10], while
for Wikipedia editing (events correspond to consequent edits of Wikipedia
articles) it is ∼ 0.6 [12]. The maximum of the histogram of B, for attacks,
Fig. 5b, has larger values than for communication, Fig. 5c. This illustrates the
intuitive understanding of the nature of these actions: attacks appear highly
clustered within short time intervals, while communication is more uniformly
distributed over time.
3 Action-specific dynamics: Decay constants of human actions
In this section, we ask if it is possible to discriminate between actions types
given only information about their interevent time distributions. We can show
that the “decay” of the interevent time distribution serves as a distinguishing
feature of action types. To quantify this decay we introduce “decay constants”
and “decay exponents” that are specific for different actions. We calculate the
inverse cumulative distributions of interevent times P≥(τ) for each of the seven
action types. They are shown in Fig. 6 for communication (C), attacks (A),
trade (T) and for the friendship-enmity marking actions F, D, E, and X. Due
to the massive contribution of C actions, the curve for all actions is dominated
by the C distribution.
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Figure 6. Inverse cumulative distribution of interevent times τ for all players
(no binning) and for different kinds of actions. The actions are: communication
(C); attack(A); giving gifts / trade (T); making friends/enemies (F/E); removing
friends/enemies (D/X). Inset: same plot in log-linear scale, for τ > 2 · 107 sec (> 8
months).
Based on our previous observations (see Section 2), we are particularly inter-
ested in the behavior on three different time scales: immediate reaction where
τ does not exceed a couple of minutes; early day, τ is less than 8 hours; and
the late day, τ is between 8 and 24 hours. Our main observations are
• Immediate reaction (τ ≤ 360 sec). P≥(τ) is shown in Fig. 7a. All curves
have a tendency to decay fast at small values of τ . The decay is espe-
cially pronounced for A, D, F, X, and E actions. This means that short
interevent times are typical for most of the actions. Large numbers of at-
tacks or emotional addings-removings are performed one-by-one in a very
fast way (grouped into sequences), while the probabilities of τ values greater
than 1 min start to decrease very slowly. The decay for short interevent
times for T and C is less steep, whereas its further evolution remains more
homogeneous.
• Early day (6 min < τ < 8 hours). For this case P≥(τ) is best approximated
by a power law
P≥(τ) ∼ τ
−α , (2)
with small exponents in the range of α ∼ 0.01 − 0.1 for all actions except
C, for which we have α ∼ 0.24, see Fig. 7b. The exponents for each curve
are collected in the second column of Tab. 2.
• Late day (8 hours < τ < 24 hours). P≥(τ) in this region is shown in Fig. 7c.
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Figure 7. Inverse cumulative distributions of τ in different time intervals. (a) τ ≤ 360
sec, log-linear scale; (b) τ ≤ 105 sec, log-log scale (fits obtained from 6 min – 8 hours
interval); (c) τ ≤ 105 sec, log-linear scale (fits from 8–24 hours interval). Behavior
on three different time scales is governed by different decay constants, see Tab. 2
and text.
We fit here the decay by the exponential function,
P≥(τ) ∼ exp (−τ/τ0) . (3)
Values of τ0 are collected in the third column of Tab. 2. The slow exponential
decay is described by slightly different action-specific values of τ0. This
difference has a tendency to diminish for larger time intervals. The fastest
decay is observed for C, with τ0 ≃ 5.6 · 10
−6, which is twice as large as for
A (τ0 ≃ 2.5 · 10
−6), and ten times larger than for the other actions.
• Long times(τ > 2 · 107 sec). An exponential cut-off for large τ (more than
eight months) becomes apparent in P≥(τ), see Fig. 6. The exponential decay
has similar numerical values for the different actions providing evidence for
a cut off effect.
The results indicate that the various types of actions are characterised by
distinct decay properies of the interevent time distributions. The values α in
Eq. (2) and τ0 in Eq. (3) may serve as “decay constants” and turn out to be
action specific. This is especially pronounced for interevent times in the time
intervals “early-day” (6 min < τ < 8 hours), and “late-day” (8 hours < τ <
24 hours). The “long time” exponential decay can be safely interpreted as a
finite size effect of the sample. The average values of interevent times τ also
point on the different speed in performing different kinds of actions. Due to
the contribution of some rare but large values of τ , as well as the periods of
natural inactivity (circadian cycles), the values of τ are large: ∼ 12.6h for C,
∼ 51.8h for A, ∼ 117.1h for T, ∼ 439.3h for F, ∼ 579.3h for D, ∼ 414.3h for
E, ∼ 829.5h for X. τ is smallest for communication and much larger for any
other kind of activity.
We conclude this section by studying players of different type. For the majority
of actions, the interevent time distributions of males and females are very sim-
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Table 2
Decay constants and decay exponents for various actions at different time scales.
The interevent time distribution P≥(τ) for the early-day interval is governed by the
power law, Eq. (2), whereas the late-day and long-time intervals are governed by the
exponential decay, Eq. (3). Values for α and τ0 are given in the table for different
types of actions.
early-day α late-day τ0 long times τ0
A -0.07 -2.46e-06 -3.64e-08
T -0.05 -1.81e-06 -3.71e-08
C -0.24 -5.65e-06 -4.55e-08
E -0.01 -0.56e-07 -3.49e-08
F -0.03 -0.88e-07 -3.80e-08
X -0.01 -0.29e-07 -3.41e-08
D -0.01 -0.34e-07 -3.13e-08
ilar. We concentrate here on the actions where slight gender effect is present.
In Fig. 8a we compare P≥(τ) (for small τ) for the E, F, D, and X actions of fe-
male (solid curves) and male (dashed curves) game characters. There is a slight
gender effect in action interevent times in the process of marking friends and
enemies, compatible what has been previously reported on a social network
level in [27]. The difference for the negative actions (enemy adding and friend
removing) and the positive actions (friend adding and enemy removing) might
be explained by underlying biological or socio-dynamic reasons. Whereas the
interevent time distributions of males and females performing positive actions
(F and X) almost coincide, this is not the case for the negative actions (E and
D), see Fig. 8a. The corresponding curves for females are always above those
for males: negative actions performed by females have shorter time intervals.
Whereas male and female act almost similarly when performing positive ac-
tions, females are faster in negative ones. Note, however, that such difference
is not observed for the A, T, and C actions.
The details of the friendship-enmity marking actions can be observed also for
players with different experience. Fig. 8b shows P≥(τ) (for small τ) are shown
for young (solid curves) and old (dashed curves) players: the F curves coincide
for young Pardus players. Old players are defined as those who have started
the game at least one year before the last day of the data set. Young players
are those who are younger than one year. The other curves for old players are
always above those of the young players. The time intervals between marking
somebody as an enemy or removing the marks are shorter for experienced
players. The speed of marking friends is the same for all players. The majority
of friends are typically marked early on in Pardus “life”.
Figure 8. Inverse cumulative distributions P≥(τ) (for τ ≤ 360 sec) for different type
of players: (a) male (dashed) and female (solid), (b) young (solid) and old (dashed).
Gender differences for actions C, T and A are minimal, we only present F, E, D
and X actions here. Whereas the interevent time distributions of males and females
performing positive actions (F and X) almost coincide, this is not the case for the
negative actions (E and D). The situation is different for the groups of young and
old players: marking of friends is performed with about the same speed for both
ages, the old players are always faster with the other actions.
4 Global dynamics and activity patterns: War and peace
We now study how actions are distributed in time. The number of all actions
types pooled together is shown for every day in Fig. 9. The time interval starts
on 2007/06/12 and covers 1,238 consecutive days of players activity. There
are four pronounced peaks in the player activity which can not be understood
without knowing the history of the virtual world during the observation period.
• The peak of activity on March, 2008 (magenta line in figure) was caused by
the introduction of new major game features called “Syndicates” on March
7, 2008 [37]. Big changes in the game usually become a hot topic to discuss,
leading to the higher level of C activity.
• The peak of activity in August-September, 2008 (blue stripe in figure) cor-
responds to the 1st war, that occurred in the period between 2008-08-08 and
2008-09-17 (war I).
• The peak of activity in January-March, 2008 (green stripe in figure) corre-
sponds to the 2nd war, 2009-01-18 – 2009-03-04 (war II).
• The peak of activity in end December 2019 – February 2010 (orange stripe
in figure) corresponds to a 3rd war between 2009-12-25 and 2010-02-12 (war
III).
Before discussing player activity in peace and war periods we briefly explain
how a war emerges in the virtual world. According to the specifics of the
game [21] each player can belong to one of three factions (organizations) or stay
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Figure 9. Number of actions (all types) per day on the timeline. There are four
pronounced peaks in the player activities that correspond to specific events that
happened in the virtual world in the observation period: the three coloured vertical
stripes indicate war periods, the vertical line indicates the introduction of a major
new game feature.
neutral. There are three factions in the game: 1 – “Federation”, 2 – “Empire”,
3 – “Union”. Only two factions can participate in a war simultaneously. During
the observation period the following pairs of factions were involved in wars:
Factions 1 and 2 in war I and factions 1 and 3 in the next two wars. Factions
2 and 3 were never engaged in a war within the observation period.
Table 3 collects basic statistics of actions during war and peace periods. The
change in activity that leads to the overall increase of the number of actions
of players engaged in war can be analyzed in more detail by studying the
distributions for specific actions. The most distinct peaks are observed for
C and A. In Fig. 10 we show the weekly number of C (a) and A (b) for
the different factions. The highest number of actions occurs in those factions
that are involved in wars. While the general level of activity during the wars
increases, there are no distinct differences in the distributions of interevent
times for peace and war periods, respectively.
Taken that a war in a virtual world arises as a result of a complex process of
social interactions between the players it is tempting to seek for war precursors.
To this end we decided to check whether changes in player activity (of the
different actions) may serve as a predictor for an upcoming war. In Pardus
war officially starts whenever a so-called “faction-relation” ratio, defined by
the game system for each pair of factions, exceeds a certain threshold value.
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Table 3
Statistics of behavioural time series corresponding to war and peace periods (all
actions). N is the number of players that performed actions in a given period; Na is
number of actions they performed; Nτ is the number of interevent time (τ) values;
τmax is the maximal interevent time. Also given, percentage of positive and negative
actions, percentage of actions performed by male players. The last line represents
data for the overall peace period (all war periods ignored).
N Na Nτ τ
max [sec] % pos
actions
% neg
actions
% male
All wars† 4,883 1,350,144 1,345,119 9,856,569 84.9 15.1 87.5
War I 3,034 422,386 419,181 3,111,881 84.2 15.8 86.8
War II 3,173 470,262 466,928 3,828,040 87.5 12.5 87.0
War III 2,816 457,496 454,532 4,024,289 82.8 17.2 88.5
Peace‡ 7,776 7,023,065 7,015,281 52,305,174 90.4 9.6 86.4
† Peace periods are ignored in the calculation of tint
‡ War periods are ignored in the calculation of tint
The faction-relation is evaluated daily in a specific way that takes into account
numerous behavioural factors of all players organised in factions, for more
information see [21].
To test if one can predict a war based on activity data only, we applied a cross-
correlation analysis and scanned for potential lead effects of activity patterns
on the faction-relation time series. We performed a systematic scan for lead-
lag relationships, involving all types of actions (some are seen in Fig. 10), all
combinations of factions, for several sizes of time-windows. While we see clear
differences between periods of war in peace in the extend of cross-correlations,
we were unable to find conclusive precursors for the onset of war. This negative
finding does not exclude the existence of other indicators that could have more
predictive power than the activity patterns alone.
The cross-correlation values (colors) for all actions as a potential predictor for
the faction-relation time series are presented in Fig. 11. Lead and lag values
are on positive and negative y-axis, respectively. War regions are marked by
vertical bars.
5 Conclusions
We used records about player activities in the MMOG Pardus to analyze
several dynamical features of player actions. It has been shown in previous
work that the characters in Pardus display rich and realistic social behav-
ior [22, 24–32]. This includes the complex multiplex network structure of the
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Figure 10. Number of weekly actions for different factions of players: (a) communi-
cation C; ( b) attacks A. Activity of players involved in wars increased during the
wars.
Pardus society, complex multiplex network topologies of social interactions,
non-ergodic behavioral action sequences, etc. In the present study we extend
these observations by a thorough analysis of the interevent time distributions
P≥(τ) for the activities players can perform in the game. In particular, we have
shown that the interevent time distributions in the Pardus universe highly non-
trivial in nature. One feature of these distributions is an presence of periodic
patterns on different scales, which correspond on the one hand to trivial cir-
cadian cycles, on the other hand to more non-trivial periods of the working
day and to short scales of straightaway reactions. Similar to human activities
in the real-world, non-trivial distributions go hand in hand with bursty dy-
namics [2,3,5,8]. The measured value of burstiness of player actions, B ≃ 0.6
is compatible to the values reported for other types of human actions [10, 12]
and implies long periods of inactivity between active periods.
Interevent time distributions for different actions show that although these
distributions share several features, they are specific for the various types
of actions. Different kinds of actions are characterized by different decay con-
stants which indicate the typical “speed” of performing: time intervals between
messages are usually shorter comparing with the other actions kinds, while
the attack are performed more fast than trade; the longest time is necessary
for friendship and enmity marking. We quantified decay times by exponential,
Eq. (3), and power law, Eq. (2) fits to P≥(τ), depending on the time scale. The
interevent time distributions are well fitted by power law within the interval 6
min < τ < 8 hours, while longer time intervals (6 min < τ < 8 hours) they are
distributed exponentially. For long interevent times (8 hours < τ < 24) the
differences between actions types become less pronounced. The average values
of interevent times τ also indicates different speeds in performing different
types of actions. Even given the inactivity periods due to circadian cycles, the
value of τ is smallest for communication and is much larger for other types.
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Figure 11. Cross-correlations between the number of actions (all types pooled to-
gether) and the faction relation for different factions using the sliding window of
size 100 days. (a) factions 1 and 2. Note that they fight against each other in war I;
(b) factions 1 and 3. They fight in wars II and III; (c) factions 2 and 3, who never
fight against each other.
Finally, we observed periods of increased activity in the Pardus due to history
specific events, such as wars that were waged in the game. Our search for
potential predictive indicators that would signal the onset of war lead to the
negative conclusion that changes in player activity does not serve as reliable
indicator of an upcoming massive conflict.
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